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The Political Economy of Long-Term Revenue Decline in Sri Lanka 
 
Mick Moore 
 
 
Summary 
 
From the 1950s to the 1980s, Sri Lankan governments collected a high proportion of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in taxes. They spent most of that money on mass provision of 
health and education services, and subsidised food. Sri Lanka was a model welfare state, 
with unusually high human development indicators. Contemporary Sri Lankan governments 
spend very little on their poor citizens. A major reason is that since 1990 the proportion of 
GDP collected in tax revenue has steadily declined, such that it is now at unusually low 
levels. Internal conflict, although almost endemic, does not explain declining tax collection. 
The decline results from a continuous series of policy decisions to exempt wealthier people, 
businesses, incomes and assets from taxes. This paper analyses the more identifiable 
political and institutional processes through which the political preferences of the wealthy and 
powerful were translated into low revenue collection. They are: the declining power of 
popular forces (notably programmatic political parties and trade unions); the emergence of 
foreign aid and loans as an alternative to domestic revenue mobilisation; the 
institutionalisation of pressure to exempt the private sector from taxes; powerful executive 
presidents who undermined or dispensed with the authority of ministers of finance; and a 
political and institutional lock-in to a high dependence on taxes levied on a declining sector of 
the economy – imports – and to the Customs Department that collects them. 
 
Keywords: taxation; Sri Lanka; history; Customs Department; Inland Revenue Department; 
inequality. 
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Introduction: taxing fashions 
 
Governments of poorer countries should aim to raise a higher proportion of Gross National 
Product (GNP) in tax revenue.1 Every government should aim to collect at least 20 per cent 
of GNP. These are the messages that the international community has been sending out in 
recent years.2 Taxing has become internationally fashionable. Sri Lankan governments have, 
however, been following their own, very different, fiscal fashions. They were once quite avid 
taxers. For the first 30 years after independence in 1948, the ratio of government revenue 
collection to GDP – a figure that I will henceforth term the ‘tax take’ – oscillated around a 
long-term average of 21 per cent.3 This was a rather high figure for a country that was then 
relatively poor. In the 1980s, the tax take settled down to a near-stable 20 per cent. But it 
began to decline from around 1990, slowly but almost continuously.4 By 2014 the figure had 
almost halved, to just 11 per cent of GDP (see Table 1). This figure is exceptionally low. The 
government currently collects only about half as much revenue as one would expect when 
one takes into account the structure of the economy, and the fact that Sri Lanka is now a 
middle-income country (World Bank 2012: 7).5  
 
Table 1 Summary economic and fiscal statistics, 5-year average 
Period Government 
revenue as 
% of GDP 
Ratio of 
government 
spending to 
government 
revenue 
Annual rate 
of GDP 
growth (%) 
Official development assistance as % 
of government expenditure 
Terms of 
trade (note 
1) (1951 = 
100) 
    OECD figures World Bank figures  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
1951-55 21     91 
1956-60 23     93 
1961-55 22 1.3 3.6 3 3 78 
1966-70 21 1.3 5.3 8 9 60 
1971-75 21 1.3 2.6 7 9 41 
1976-80 21 1.6 5.5 16 23 41 
1981-85 19 1.7 5.2 19 26 27 
1986-90 21 1.6 3.4 18 27 26 
1991-95 20 1.5 5.4 11 22 25 
1996-2000 18 1.4 5.0 7 10 23 
2001-05 16 1.6 4.0 8 12 21 
2006-10 15 1.5 6.4 5 8 20 
2011-14 13 1.6 7.3 3 4 19 
Sources: Figures in columns (a), (b), (c) and (f) are from the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Ceylon/Sri Lanka. 
Figures in column (d) are from the OECD (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-
finance-data/>), and those in column (e) are from the World Development Indicators (<http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators>). 
Note 1: Terms of trade = ratio of prices of exports to prices of imports, relative to a benchmark period. 
                                                     
1  Government revenue is conventionally divided into tax and non-tax revenue. The distinction between the two is, 
however, not clear-cut. In Sri Lanka, as in most countries, non-tax revenue is relatively small: it has accounted for an 
average of 12% of total annual revenue since 1970/1. It comprises mainly income from the ownership of property and 
other assets, and a range of fees and administration charges. In this paper I ignore the distinction, and use the terms 
‘revenue’ and ‘tax’ interchangeably. 
2  e.g. these proposals were in the initial draft communiqué of the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 2015.  
3  Unless stated otherwise, all statistics relating to Sri Lanka are those given in the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka. 
4  The raw figures on the tax take provide some scope to disagree on the exact date of the onset of the decline. I have 
chosen 1990 by calculating a three-year moving average of the tax take.  
5  Within South Asia, Sri Lanka is matched only by Bangladesh as the least effective collector of income taxes. It is only 
about half as effective as the average low-income country (World Bank 2012). 
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This low tax take is a problem, above all for poorer Sri Lankans.6 Sri Lanka was once known 
as a model welfare state. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was widely cited as a model of 
impressive human development outcomes (health, mortality and education) despite low 
average income. That is no longer the case. On some calculations, the Sri Lankan 
government spends less on education than any of its peers in the South Asian region. The 
quality of public education is poor. A country, which for four decades provided subsidised 
food grains every week for virtually the entire population – and at one point was spending 
more than 20 per cent of the government budget on this activity, does not even have a 
minimally acceptable cash transfer programme to meet the needs of its poorer citizens. 
These needs are now growing fast because the population is rapidly ageing, and neither the 
private nor public sectors have the savings that are needed to care for the elderly. Further, 
the overall pattern of fiscal activities is regressive: wealthier people pay relatively little in tax, 
but do rather well out of public spending. The Treasury also has a pressing fiscal reason to 
be concerned. The combination of the low tax take with persistent fiscal deficits and a high 
public debt burden is now pushing up the cost of government borrowing. 
 
 
1  An unprecedented and puzzling decline  
 
A decrease in the national tax take is not unusual. There are many examples in recent 
history.7 Sometimes, as in the case of a few rich OECD countries over the past two decades, 
it reflects conscious policy: a determination to ‘shrink the state’. More commonly, it reflects 
governance failures. Internal armed conflict and/or the inability of government to exercise 
effective authority make it difficult to continue to collect taxes at previous levels. This was, for 
example, broadly the story in Peru, Rwanda and Uganda in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 
each of those cases, the emergence of an effective national government restored the tax 
take to its previous level or more within about a decade. 
 
The decline in the tax take in Sri Lanka over the period since 1990 has a very different 
character. It was the result neither of sustained explicit policy choices, nor of any particular 
challenges in physically collecting taxes. It took place gradually over a long time period, 
rarely received public notice, and occurred in circumstances that would be expected to 
produce a different result: at least stability in the ratio of revenue to GDP, and perhaps an 
increase. 
 
In the quarter century after 1990 when the tax take was decreasing, the Sri Lankan economy 
was expanding rather fast, at an average annual rate of 5.4 per cent (Table 1). There is a 
strong and well-researched statistical relationship, which holds globally, between the average 
per capita income of a country and the size of the tax take. The governments of richer 
countries collect a larger proportion of GDP in public revenue. When national economies 
grow faster, the tax take tends to increase (Pessino and Fenochietto 2010; Minh Le et al. 
2012). Because Sri Lanka was already a relatively high tax economy in the 1950s to the 
1980s, a further increase in the tax take was perhaps unlikely. In the absence of any clear 
policy commitments from successive Sri Lankan governments, we might have expected the 
tax take to remain at around the long-term average of 20 per cent of GDP. The decline to half 
that expected figure is a puzzle. It is even more of a puzzle when we take account of the fact 
that between 1983 and 2009, a period of 26 years, the Sri Lankan armed forces were in 
almost continuous armed conflict with Tamil separatist groups.8 The armed forces expanded 
                                                     
6  For more details on the issues summarised in this paragraph, see World Bank (2015: 170). 
7  The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset provides the most comprehensive and reliable statistics, covering almost all 
countries <http://www.ictd.ac/datasets/the-ictd-government-revenue-dataset>. 
8  Tamil separatism was not the only cause of internal armed conflict. During the years 1987-89, much of the country, 
including Colombo, was affected by a significant insurgency led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) – a party of 
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greatly in terms of numbers, and purchased much new equipment (Venugopal 2011). It was 
an expensive war, which might have been expected to put strong pressure on successive 
governments to raise additional revenue. Governments did not respond in that way. The 
long-term decline in the tax take began in 1990, only seven years after a low-level separatist 
insurgency flared up into war in 1983, and at the same time that the number of military 
personnel was fast expanding. The tax take continued to decline almost every year until the 
war was concluded.9 It is important to note that, just as the war did not prevent the economy 
from growing steadily, it did not make raising revenue significantly more difficult. The conflict 
was fought mainly in the peripheral agricultural areas of the North and East of the country 
that had never been the source of much tax revenue. It did not significantly interfere with tax 
collection at the points where it is heavily concentrated: the port and airport in Colombo 
(Sections 2 and 8). Further, the steepest decline in the tax take was in the years after the war 
ended in 2009.10 Internal conflict does not explain the decline in the tax take. The decline 
was clearly the result of policy choices, even if those choices were rarely articulated 
consciously and publicly. 
 
In Section 2, I explain why Sri Lanka was a high-tax economy in the years before 1990. 
Then, in Sections 3 to 8, I attempt to resolve the puzzle of the subsequent decline. 
 
 
2  Why was the tax take high in the mid-
twentieth century?11 
 
Between 1950 and 1989, the Sri Lankan government’s tax take averaged 21 per cent of 
GDP. Why was the tax take so high in what was then, in the global context, a low-income 
country? There are broadly four reasons. 
 
First, the economy has, since the colonial era, been intrinsically taxable. Successive 
governments had the ability to raise revenue relatively easily through taxing international 
trade and a relatively wealthy and commercialised economy, without needing to either: (a) 
develop a very high capacity tax collection apparatus, (b) extract revenue directly – and 
inevitably somewhat painfully – from small-scale cultivators,12 or (c) tax any significant 
component of the population directly. In the context of the South and South-East Asia region, 
Sri Lanka was a high-income country during the colonial period.13 The reason was the 
                                                     
the majority Sinhalese community. For some months, the JVP succeeded in significantly disrupting economic activity 
(Moore 1993). However, this left no visible mark on revenue collection levels. 
9  The National Security Levy was introduced in 1992, ostensibly to pay for the war. Between 1995 and 2002, when it was 
abolished, it provided more than 10% of revenue annually. This did not, however, stem the steady decline in the overall 
tax take. The Nation Building Tax, which has provided over 4% of total revenue annually, was introduced in 2009, the 
year the war ended. As is explained in the next footnote, the total tax take began to decline particularly steeply 
immediately after the Nation Building Tax was launched. 
10  Total revenue collection averaged 21.0% of GDP over the period 1989-1991 (Table 1). Over the next 20 years, until the 
end of the war in 2009, the tax take declined by 6.4 percentage points – an annual average of 0.32 percentage points. 
Over the five-year period from 2009 to 2014, the tax take declined by 3.3 percentage points – an annual average of 0.66 
percentage points. This was in large part the direct result of major tax giveaways in the 2010 budget. 
11  Snodgrass (1966) is an excellent source of statistics and analysis of the economic history of Sri Lanka. 
12  In most of the rest of South Asia, direct taxes on the owners or cultivators of agricultural land, collected on the basis of 
detailed written records of who owned and cultivated each piece of land, were the dominant source of colonial 
government revenue in the 19th century, and a significant source in the early part of the 20th century. Land taxes 
provided an important platform for the Congress Party and other nationalist movements to mobilise popular support 
against colonial rule. By contrast, Sri Lankan rulers historically had found it easier to extract revenue from international 
trade than from agriculturalists. Until 1893, the British colonial administration collected a small amount of revenue from 
taxes on the production of rice and other grains. The grain tax was abolished once the plantation sector became a 
buoyant source of revenue in the 1880s (Roberts 1973).  
13  In 1820, average per capita income in Sri Lanka was about the same as in India. By 1939, it was double Indian levels 
(Maddison n.d.) In the early 20th  century, large numbers of people had moved to Sri Lanka from India for manual work, 
notably in the plantations and in Colombo.  
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dominance of the plantation export economy. The production and export of tea and, to a 
lesser extent, rubber14 generated substantial economic surpluses, large profits for British 
plantation companies (Snodgrass 1966: 66), high levels of economic inequality, high average 
income – and good opportunities for governments to raise revenue rather easily.15 
International trade accounted for a high proportion of GDP, partly because large imports of 
food grains were required to feed the plantation workforce. And international trade 
dominantly took the form of highly visible bulk commodities – tea and rubber out, food grains 
and consumer goods in – routed through Colombo, which in the late colonial era was one of 
the world’s busiest ports.16 Historically, there has been no easier way for governments to 
raise substantial revenue at low cost than to levy trade taxes on visible, standardised bulk 
commodities moving through ports. In this case, almost all trade moved through a single port, 
which happened to be located a few hundred metres from the heart of government.17 The 
basic tax collection tasks – identification of the tax base, valuation, assessment and 
collection of dues – are not organisationally challenging. Import and export volumes can be 
easily verified. Provided corruption among Customs staff can be kept in check, smuggling 
and tax evasion can be kept at low levels. And, because they are invisible to most citizens, 
Customs duties typically generate little political opposition. 
 
Second, while colonial governments relied principally on import taxes – and refrained from 
tapping the export revenue or substantial profits of the plantation sector companies – they 
did develop a number of other revenue sources that involved more intensive interactions 
between state bureaucracies and Sri Lankan society. The major categories of government 
revenue in 1938/39 were: import duties – 47 per cent; surplus from public sector income-
earning activities (land sales, port, post office, electricity, railway, etc.) – 18 per cent; income 
taxes – 15 per cent; and excise taxes on liquor and tobacco – 13 per cent (Snodgrass 1966: 
385). Imagine the colonial administration as a machine for ensuring the continual flow of 
plantation exports and profits. To achieve that goal, it had to develop and operate road, port, 
railway and electricity facilities; control the ever-present threat of tropical diseases; manage 
extensive movement of labour to and from India; make it possible for land to be sold or 
leased with secure title; establish effective court and police systems; and keep the social 
peace. The colonial state was relatively intrusive. It extensively reordered economy and 
society.18 It was, correspondingly, relatively costly. In 1929, the state collected and spent 
about 14 per cent of GNP (Snodgrass 1966: 62).19  
 
                                                     
14  There were also substantial coconut plantations, but they mainly served the domestic market. For the years 1940, 1950 
and 1960, tea accounted for 68% of the combined value of plantation crop exports, and rubber for 30% (Snodgrass 
1966). 
15  The plantation export economy also generated high levels of volatility in export earnings, and therefore in government 
revenue. World market prices for tea and rubber were volatile for the same reasons that oil and mineral prices fluctuate 
today. There is a gap of several years between the decision to invest in increased production capacity and actual 
production increases. In the short term, an increase in demand can push up prices substantially. But, because 
producers tend to invest in new production capacity in response, large increases in supply, and thus price falls, can 
follow within a few years. In the 1950s to the 1970s, in particular, the Sri Lankan economy was highly import-
constrained. When tea and rubber prices were low, imports were cut back, and the overall level of economic activity 
declined. As a consequence, the tax take ranged between 16% (in 1950) and 27% (in 1978). It became more stable 
after 1980, when the economy was fast being diversified away from the plantation export sector.  
16  Historically there had been substantial port facilities at Galle and Trincomalee, but from the 1880s Colombo port 
dominated. It also enjoyed a large transit trade, and in 1939 accounted for 95% of total shipping tonnage (Dharmasena 
1980). Smuggling seems to have been limited to very small-scale trade carried in small boats between India and minor 
ports on the Jaffna peninsula, like Point Pedro and Velvetturai.  
17  The collection of revenue by the Customs Department remains highly concentrated in Colombo, now including the 
airport. In 2014, the Revenue and Services (Provincial) Directorate, which is responsible for all revenue collection 
outside Colombo, accounted for 0.3% of the total revenue collected by the Customs Department (Sri Lanka Customs 
2015). 
18  Under colonial rule, unofficial (or non-state) customary courts disappeared from Sri Lanka. By contrast, in what is now 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, customary courts dealt with at least half of all court cases in the late colonial period 
(Lange 2009). 
19  In 1937, the colonial government of Ceylon spent four times as much per head of population as the colonial 
governments of India (Frankema 2010). 
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Third, Sri Lanka became an unambiguously high-tax economy after independence in 1948 
because governments were then minded to go after a prime potential revenue source that 
had hitherto been untouchable: earnings from plantation exports, and thus the profits of the 
largely British-owned plantation sector. The first independent government began immediately 
to levy substantial taxes on plantation exports,20 and to cut heavily into the post-tax profits of 
the plantation companies (Snodgrass 1966: 114).21 That government, like its successors, 
was dominated by a relatively homogenous Sri Lankan socio-economic elite that itself was 
relatively heavily-invested in the plantation export economy – and acquiring more of the 
Island’s capital stock as the British began to sell (Roberts 1982). Governments were, 
however, swayed more by the dynamics of highly competitive electoral politics, with high 
rates of voter turnout, than by the specific material class interests of the political elite. They 
were motivated to tax heavily because, for the following combination of reasons, they were 
under strong electoral pressure to expand public spending:22 
 
 At independence, Sri Lankan society (and economy and polity) were relatively capitalist 
and, in the language of the time, modern. Plantation production had rather thoroughly re-
ordered social, economic and political relationships in most of the island. A modern 
bureaucratic state had embedded itself relatively deeply in rural as well as urban areas. 
Compared to most of South Asia, networks of caste, kin, community and patron-
clientelism had been much weakened (Moore 2008; Lange 2009; Gerring et al. 2011). 
Further, the experience of formal employment in large-scale organisations was 
widespread. A collection of large and relatively class-conscious proletariats – especially 
in the plantations, railways, ports, road transport and in the government clerical services 
– had created a lively trade union movement. The trade unions frequently exercised their 
collective power in labour markets. They also helped nurture a range of leftist political 
parties. From the 1930s, several more or less allied Marxist movements began to 
develop into mass parties. They obtained a quarter of all votes cast at the 1947 general 
election. In Sri Lanka, as elsewhere in Asia at that time, there were widespread 
expectations and fears of a Marxist revolution. It was not enough for the political 
establishment to respond by expanding their offerings to voters through patron-client 
networks: the promise of a government job for this person, or an improved road for that 
village. They also responded to the more universalistic – and expensive – demands from 
the political left for free health and education for all the working classes (and the 
peasantry). 
 The electoral demand for free universal health and education services in part reflected 
the fact that in the 1930s the plantation companies had begun to provide such services to 
                                                     
20  The mode of taxation varied. In 1968, the government introduced the Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate (FEEC) 
device into its exchange control programme. Exporters were required to surrender all the foreign exchange that they 
earned to the Central Bank. The Central Bank remunerated them in rupees at a relatively unfavourable rate. If that 
same exporter was able to get permission to purchase foreign exchange in order to import, she would have to pay 
significantly more rupees to purchase one dollar than she had been paid for each dollar she earned as an exporter. 
From a fiscal perspective, this is equivalent to placing a tax on exporters. 
21  The requirement that all tea and rubber be sold through public auction, rather than private contract, provided the 
government with data that could easily be used to calculate export earnings for individual estates and companies. It is 
an indication of how amenable the tea industry was to central planning that during World War 2 all tea was purchased 
by the Tea Commissioner on behalf on the British Ministry of Food at prices fixed separately for each tea estate, to take 
account of variations in quality and the cost of production. To tax the plantation sector – and thus most companies and 
many wealthy individuals – there was no need to develop a sophisticated capacity to interrogate in detail the accounts 
of the companies that owned and managed plantations and traded in tea and rubber. Nevertheless, it is likely that the 
profits from plantation production and export were in practice taxed less heavily than the official records suggest. Many 
of the transactions between the companies that owned the estates, the managing agencies that operated many of them 
on contract, the commodity brokers in Colombo and London, shippers, tea wholesalers and retailers in London, and 
insurers were not ‘arm’s length’. The sector was characterised by complex cross shareholdings, interlocking 
directorates, and relatively stable long-term, non-competitive relationships between different organisations. This 
provided many opportunities for what is today termed tax planning, i.e. using accountants to formally shift profits 
between enterprises, locations, and functions in order to minimise tax obligations (Government of Ceylon 1974). 
22  Useful background sources for this section include Singer (1964); Snodgrass (1966); Kearney (1971); de Silva (1973); 
Kearney (1974); Jupp (1978); Moore (2008). 
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the large population resident on their estates. This provided a model and stimulus for 
demands that the government provide similar services for the rest of the population.23 
 The expansion of the plantation economy resulted in high levels of road connectivity, and 
public infrastructure more generally in most rural areas of Sri Lanka, especially the more 
densely populated areas where the majority of the population lived. High levels of 
education, literacy, post office provision, road connectivity and direct interaction with 
public servants – along with early universal suffrage – generated high levels of 
awareness of national political issues, and facilitated the political mobilisation of the rural 
population around national and relatively universalistic – rather than local and 
particularistic – political issues and parties. By the 1960s, levels of voter turnout in Sri 
Lanka were among the highest in the world (Jupp 1978: 189).  
 During World War 2, it was difficult and expensive to procure the large volumes of rice 
that had hitherto been imported to feed the plantation labour force. The government 
instituted a rice ration scheme that involved distributing a weekly quota of rice (or wheat 
flour) to every family for free (or at a subsidised rate). At the end of the war, with 
independence in sight, the government decided to continue the scheme. The population 
quickly became very attached to it. Attempts to end or significantly reduce it generated 
vociferous political opposition, above all in 1953 when violent protests resulted in a 
change of government. For the next quarter century, successive governments were 
locked into financing this major expenditure programme (Section 4). 
 
Fourth, governments were encouraged to increase the tax take to high levels because there 
was little popular resistance to taxation. Especially after independence, one possible reason 
was that most of the population24 were routinely receiving very substantial resources and 
services from the government: mass formal education; relatively advanced preventive and 
curative health services; and, most visibly, the weekly rice ration. Likely more important was 
the fact that the bulk of the population paid few – or no – direct visible taxes at all.25 The main 
exceptions were among the consumers of liquor and tobacco.26 The tax collector rarely 
intruded on most ordinary people, cultivators, informal business enterprise, most domestic 
wholesale and retail trade, or owners of urban real estate.27  
 
It is impossible to confirm a causal connection between this lack of significant experience of 
taxation, and the ways in which Sri Lankans learned to think about governance and public 
policy. It is, however, noticeable that, in the politics surrounding the big expansion of public 
services and public sector resource redistribution in the 1930s to the 1950s, there is little 
trace of what one might term ‘fiscal contract’ ideas: notions of some connection between 
                                                     
23  The back story here is that most resident plantation labourers were recent immigrants from India. The colonial 
government of India took responsibility for their welfare, and put pressure on Sri Lankan colonial governments to ensure 
that plantation companies provided health and education for their employees (Wickremeratne 1973). 
24  The main exceptions were among the Tamil population of recent Indian origin who provided the bulk of the plantation 
labour force. Many were stateless from 1948 until 1985. 
25  Neither were the wealthy much affected by the wide range of policy initiatives taken between the mid-1950s and the 
mid-1970s to tax them directly: high marginal rates of personal income tax; a Compulsory Savings Scheme; an annual 
Wealth Tax; very briefly, a tax on large land holdings, and more than one effort to implement the economist Nicolas 
Kaldor’s suggestion of an Expenditure Tax, to be levied on the difference between the assessed annual income and 
expenditure of wealthy individuals. Collectively, these taxes generated little revenue, partly at least because the 
Department of Inland Revenue lacked the administrative tools to actually implement the legislation. e.g. the 1968 
Taxation Inquiry Commission pointed out that it was hard to tax capital effectively when the Valuation Department, 
which should have played a central role in valuing assets and maintaining property registers, was not under the control 
of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Government of Ceylon 1968).  
26  But informal production and consumption of liquor was widespread, and Buddhist doctrine and mass Buddhist 
organisations tended to frown on drink and tobacco. It would, however, have been hard to make a convincing case that 
the activities of the Excise Department were immoral. The Excise Department was established in 1911 to police and tax 
the liquor trade. Its functions included licensing retail sales of liquor, collecting excise taxes from licensed distilleries, 
and suppressing unlicensed production and sales of liquor (and drugs). Its mode of operation was, and remains, to 
some degree paramilitary, and focused on monitoring flows of physical commodities.  
27  In the colonial period, Urban Councils levied a recurrent local property tax along the lines of the British local rates 
system. As in much of South Asia, the system formally continued after independence, with modifications, but declined to 
become a minor source of public revenue. 
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citizenship as entitlement to public services, and citizenship as an obligation to help finance 
those services through paying taxes. Popular political discourse has been influenced by a 
Marxian dichotomy between the state, capitalism (and colonial rule and an inadequately 
national elite) on one side, and, on the other, the people – frequently defined as the working 
classes and the peasantry. The discourse easily accommodates strong propositions about 
the financial obligations of the state to citizens, but has little place for arguments about the 
financial obligations of citizenship (Moore 1989).  
 
   
3  Explaining decreasing revenue collection 
  
Different observers might disagree on what it means to explain a phenomenon as 
complicated as the long-term decline in the Sri Lankan tax take in the quarter century after 
1990. We can sidestep concerns about social science theory and method by presenting 
three complementary explanations, rooted in different disciplinary perspectives. 
 
First, from the perspective of the tax specialist the answer seems to lie in the very wide range 
of deficiencies in both tax policy and tax administration in contemporary Sri Lanka. Revenue 
collection has declined as a proportion of GNP because governments have failed to adapt to 
major changes in economic structure by modernising revenue systems. As I explain in more 
detail in Section 9, contemporary Sri Lankan tax policy and administration is antiquated – 
surprisingly so for a middle-income country with a very high level of international exposure. 
This is not because of any conservative bias against introducing changes. In the realm of tax 
policy, in particular, Sri Lankan ministers of finance, like those of most other countries, have 
tended to be hyperactive.28 They fiddle endlessly with the tax code. But effective reforms, 
especially improvements in tax administration, have been modest when set against the 
radical changes in economic structure since independence: notably, the very big increase in 
per capita income; and the shift from a plantation export economy oriented to the United 
Kingdom, to an economy that is much more diverse in every sense, dominated by services.29  
 
Anyone with a nose for political analysis might object that this notion of an antiquated 
revenue system is not so much an explanation for the decline in the tax take, as a more 
complex way of restating the issue: the tax take declined because governments (deliberately) 
failed to reform the revenue system to keep up with changes in taxation practices, business 
models and patterns of economic activity. The second explanation for the decline in the tax 
take is, therefore, a simple political proposition: governments wanted and willed it, and 
needed to do little to achieve it except keep quiet and avoid significantly improving the 
capacity of their revenue collection system. This argument contains a great deal of truth. 
Without it, we would be in danger of missing some very important points:  
 
 The decline in the tax take has gone hand in hand with major reductions in the types of 
public spending that mainly benefit poorer people.  
 Because of this, and the failure of the revenue system to significantly tax fast-growing 
incomes and new wealth, the fiscal system has moved strongly against the poor. 
 The near-silence about revenue issues in policy discourse over many decades has been 
in the interests of the wealthier sections of the population.  
 
The argument that it is ‘all political’ is broadly correct. In that simple form, it is insufficiently 
nuanced and detailed, and ultimately not very persuasive. The third explanation, which 
                                                     
28  e.g. the 1968 Taxation Enquiry Commission produced a list of twenty-one new taxes that had been imposed since 
1953/4; only six of them were still in force in 1968 (Government of Ceylon 1968). 
29  In 2014 the service sector accounted for 56% of GDP, the industrial sector 27%, and agriculture, forestry and fishing 
8%. 
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occupies most of this paper, is that there are a range of identifiable political and 
organisational processes that have particularly contributed to the relative lack of interest of 
successive governments in maintaining the tax take. I have identified five such processes. 
For the sake of brevity I will label them ‘explanations’, but that is somewhat misleading. They 
interact with one another in complex ways. To some extent, this is a story of path 
dependence. These five explanations are treated in the following order: 
 
 Declining electoral pressure for large-scale public welfare spending: from the 1940s until 
the 1970s, the Sri Lankan electorate put strong pressure on successive governments to 
establish and maintain large-scale public welfare spending – and therefore to raise the 
revenue to fund it (Section 2). Changes in the character of electoral politics, which 
became particularly apparent in the 1970s, alleviated that pressure, permitted 
governments to relate to the electorate in a more clientelistic fashion, and thus made a 
declining tax take politically more manageable. 
 Easy non-tax funding: aid inflows expanded rapidly after the 1977 general election. 
These provided substitute financial resources, and enabled governments to run larger 
fiscal deficits without feeling strong pressure to find substitute revenue. 
 Institutionalised pressure for tax exemptions: the Greater Colombo Economic 
Commission (GCEC) was established in 1978 to encourage foreign investment, with a 
chief executive responsible directly to the executive president. The powers of the GCEC 
– which was later renamed the Board of Investment – included the right to grant tax 
exemptions to investors. These powers were steadily expanded and used liberally. This 
helped to create a broader culture of tax exemptions. 
 Absentee finance ministers: for most of the period since 1989, the Ministry of Finance 
has not been directly managed by a powerful finance minister. The ‘revenue interest’ 
within the government apparatus has lacked an effective institutional voice. 
 Lock-in to import taxes: import duties have long been a major source of public revenue 
because they are so easy to collect (Section 2). This dependence has been exacerbated 
because the Customs Department, which was historically inferior to the Department of 
Inland Revenue in terms of organisational prestige and competence, has in practice 
gradually overtaken it, and exercises a correspondingly greater influence on public policy.  
 
To some extent, the ordering of these five explanations is chronological. Note also that the 
first four explanations are, albeit in varying degrees, rooted in the major transition point in the 
politics of independent Sri Lanka: the electoral landslide in favour of the United National 
Party (UNP) at the 1977 general election, and the big changes in political institutions and 
public policy that were introduced in the next few years. This democratic change to a 
government promising economic liberalisation – which also marked the end of the 
established Marxist political parties as an electoral force – brought about a major increase in 
aid inflows, and much greater involvement of international organisations in shaping economic 
policy. In summary, the major longer-term consequences were: 
 
 A broad shift in economic policy in favour of private investors and capitalism, and against 
large-scale welfare spending – especially spending on universalistic programmes rather 
than political patronage. 
 A big increase in public investment and a permanent shift from economic stagnation to 
steady economic growth – much aided later by the acceleration of economic growth in 
nearby India. 
 The establishment of a more exclusionary – and sometimes authoritarian – political 
system involving, in particular: the concentration of power in the political executive (and 
mostly in the hands of the political elite); and the ‘taming’ of mass political organisations 
through varying combinations of repression and organised patronage. 
 The institutionalisation of the interests of private investors within the government 
machinery. 
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The five explanations listed above are explored in Sections 4 to 8 respectively. 
 
Table 2 Sources of government revenue (%), 1970/1-2015, 5-year average 
 1970/1
-1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2011-
2015 
1.1 Taxes on 
foreign trade 38 42 35 30 18 15 14 17 17 
Exports 11 23 17 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Imports (net) (Note 
1)  8 13 19 26 18 15 12 10 8 
Levies (Note 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 
Receipts from 
FEECs (net) (Note 3)  19 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.2 Taxes on 
domestic goods 
and services 29 37 36 39 52 53 57 47 46 
Turnover tax 14 10 25 28 27 12 0 0 0 
GST/VAT - Domestic 0 0 0 0 0 6 16 15 11 
GST/VAT - Imports 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 15 10 
Excise taxes (liquor, 
tobacco, petroleum, 
vehicles and others) 14 26 10 11 14 17 20 16 24 
National Security 
Levy (Note 4)  0 0 0 0 11 13 6 0 0 
Licence fees  2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1.3 Taxes on net 
income and profits 16 12 16 12 13 13 14 18 17 
(Of which, corporate 
income tax) na 13 11 8 7 6 6 9 9 
(Of which, non-
corporate income 
tax) na 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 2 
Combined corporate 
and non-corporate 
income tax 16 12 16 12 13 13 10 13 12 
Save the Nation 
contributions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax on interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 
1.4 Stamp 
Duty/Cess 
Duty/Social 
Responsibility 
Levy, etc. (Note 5)  0 0 0 0 0 4 1 6 9 
1.5 Bank debit tax 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1.6 Taxes on 
property (Note 6) 1 1 2 4 4 2 0 0 0 
1.7 Taxes on 
Treasury Bills 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Total tax revenue 85 93 88 86 87 87 87 89 89 
Non-tax revenue 15 7 12 14 13 13 13 11 11 
Total revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Note 1: These figures refer only to import duties, narrowly defined, and not to the much wider range of taxes levied 
on imports (see main text). 
Note 2: Levies = a changing combination of Ports and Airports Development Levy, Regional Infrastructure 
Development Levy, the Specific Commodity Levy, and others. 
Note 3: This refers to the revenue earned from maintaining a dual foreign exchange rate. FEECs = Foreign 
Exchange Entitlement Certificates. 
Note 4: The National Security Levy was introduced in 1995, explicitly to finance the war against separatism. It was a 
levy on the value of imported and manufactured commodities, at variable rates, and with exemptions. 
Note 5: Includes: Stamp Duty on a diverse range of financial and legal transactions; import and export cess duties 
on a range of commodities; the Social Responsibility Levy, which was a surcharge on income taxes, excise duties 
and customs duties; the Nation Building Tax, charged on a range of import and export commodities. 
Note 6: Includes taxes on property transfers and taxes on capital transfers (Estate Duty, Wealth Tax, Gift Tax, etc). 
After 2000, these taxes are incorporated into 1.4. 
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4  Changing electoral pressures 
 
In the 1940s to 1970s, Sri Lankan governments were committed to large-scale spending on 
social welfare for two broad reasons explained in Section 2: a strong popular political 
movement, organised in trade unions and Marxist parties and mobilised around universalistic 
programmatic demands; and a lock-in to a large food subsidy programme (rice ration) that 
had originally emerged to cope with food scarcity during World War Two. Both of these 
underpinnings of large-scale welfare spending – and thus of the incentives to maintain a high 
tax take – were eroded: the first gradually, but with a step change in the late 1970s, and the 
second rather quickly, again in the late 1970s. One of the more visible correlates was the 
emergence of a more clientelistic pattern of politics, with lower rates of political participation, 
less stable political party affiliations on the part of both politicians and voters, and the more 
discretionary, politicised allocation of public resources to small groups of voters. These 
changes were in turn interrelated with two other major features of national politics: 
increasingly authoritarian and repressive governance (until early 2015), and ethnic conflict. 
Some major elements of this long and complex story are as follows: 
 
 The socio-economic basis for the prominent socio-political role of the proletarian trade 
unions and Marxist parties began to decline from a peak in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
near-stagnant plantation economy was failing to generate new proletarian jobs. By 
contrast, there was a relative expansion in the small-scale agriculture sector, principally 
because: (a) smallholders, supported by the distribution of large areas of state land in 
small parcels, moved into the production of tea (and to some extent rubber) in a 
significant way; and (b) after the introduction of responsible democratic internal self-
government in 1931, governments began to invest in the large-scale resettlement of 
(mainly Sinhalese) rural families as rice producers in irrigation colonies in the sparsely 
populated Dry Zone in the North and East of the island.30  
 Trade unions became less solidaristic as political parties established competing trade 
union organisations and, especially in the growing proportion of the formal sector that 
was in public ownership, unions became more strongly enmeshed in patronage networks 
(Kearney 1971). 
 Malaria, which had hitherto been endemic, was to a large degree eradicated in the later 
1940s. This resulted in a rapid increase in the birth rate, and, within two decades, the 
appearance of a ‘youth bulge’. These young people were mainly literate, and many were 
educated to secondary level and beyond. But their education was of poor quality and 
limited relevance to the labour market. Worse, the economy was generating few new 
jobs. For three decades or more after the late 1960s, there was a large reservoir of 
educated unemployed youth mobilisable for political purposes. Many were mobilised into 
radical insurrectionary identity-based political movements.31 This exacerbated the 
tendency for ethnic politics to dominate the political agenda at the expense of the class 
politics that had previously been so prominent. 
 The prominence of Marxist ministers in the 1970-1977 coalition government helped 
disguise the decline in the electoral base of the Marxist parties. They gained no seats in 
the 1977 parliamentary election, and thereafter were only sporadically represented in the 
legislature through a nomination process to the National List.  
 The new UNP government elected in 1977 was motivated and buoyed up by: a two-thirds 
majority in the legislature; a tough-minded, politically-astute leader; disillusion after 
several decades with statist and socialist economic policies that seemed to have failed to 
                                                     
30  Rapid population growth, in large part induced by the near-eradication of malaria in the late 1940s, underpinned these 
changes in the pattern of agricultural production. 
31  I refer to the first two incarnations of the (mainly Sinhalese) JVP, which engaged in insurrections in 1971 and 1988/89 
respectively; and to a range of Tamil separatist organisations, principally the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
which also have their origins in the 1970s.   
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find sources of economic growth to replace the declining plantation export sector;32 aid 
donors keen to support a new democratic government that was giving them the 
messages they wanted to hear about the virtues of the market economy and economic 
liberalisation; and a private sector that was discovering new and more diverse types of 
profitable enterprise – notably in export garment manufacture in free trade zone 
conditions, hotels, tourism, finance and real estate. 
 The new government took an authoritarian turn. A new constitution promulgated in 1978 
created an executive presidency with wide powers, and in various respects exacerbated 
the trend towards unconstrained executive rule that had been initiated in another new 
constitution introduced by the previous government in 1972. The UNP government 
adopted a robust policy towards (opposition) trade unions and political parties, and in 
various ways interfered in and further weakened the main opposition party, the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP). Rather than face new parliamentary elections in 1982, the 
government organised a referendum to extend the life of the existing parliament. An 
unprecedented degree of repression and intimidation was employed to win this 
referendum (Manor 1984). 
 This new government, with the strong support of the World Bank, seized the political 
opportunity to put an end to the rice ration scheme – under the guise of reforming it to 
make it more fit for purpose. The scheme had taken the form of a universal per capita 
weekly entitlement to a defined quantity of food grains – at different times free or at a 
subsidised price. Under the replacement system introduced in 1979, about half of 
households were allocated vouchers (food stamps) that could be used to purchase a 
range of basic consumer goods. The food stamp system was designed to self-destruct 
politically. The value of the stamps was fixed in cash terms at a time of high inflation, and 
thus declined steadily in real terms. There was no mechanism for admitting new 
recipients once the original determination of household eligibility was made in 1978. And 
that determination was made in such a cursory manner, with wide scope for local political 
and administrative discretion, that the new system was discredited from the beginning. 
Most people did not believe that food stamps were targeted towards the most needy 
households.33  
 Once the rice ration scheme had been eviscerated in this way, there was very little 
political resistance to further steps to cut the budgetary costs, further politicise decisions 
about who would benefit, and introduce procedural complexities that both 
necessitated/validated the use of micro-level administrative discretion and further 
discouraged political mobilisation in the interests of actual or potential beneficiaries. A 
universalistic programme became highly discretionary and clientelistic. The rice ration 
scheme had near-universal coverage (in reality, as well as nominally), and accounted for 
a substantial proportion of public spending. The food stamp scheme initially covered 
about 50 per cent of the population. In 1994, it was replaced by the Samurdhi (prosperity) 
scheme, which involved a complex mixture of cash transfers, loans, obligatory savings, 
training, dedicated banks and local infrastructure spending, all administered by a highly 
politicised cadre of Samurdhi officers. Beneficiaries accounted for around 30 per cent of 
the population. In 2012, that was replaced by the even more complex and diffuse Diva 
                                                     
32  This perception was exacerbated by the coincidence in the period 1970-1977 of (a) the most statist government with (b) 
a particularly steep decline in Sri Lanka’s terms of trade. Foreign exchange and imports were unusually scarce. Notions 
of socialism and economic planning were deeply discredited. 
33  The way in which the minister of finance announced the reform in his 1978 Budget Speech illustrates the extent to 
which this was an executive decision. The minister did not feel obliged to provide any details of the mechanisms to be 
used to determine which households would be eligible for food stamps. ‘It is now proposed to reduce substantially the 
distribution of rice at subsidised prices by withdrawing the rice ration from that part of the population deemed to have 
incomes above the minimum level. The administrative procedures for determining this minimum level and for affecting 
the withdrawal are already in place and will be put into effect in the next two or three weeks and I need not detain this 
House with the detail’ (Republic of Sri Lanka 1977). He then misled parliament by implying the intention to continue to 
provide a food entitlement defined in terms of weekly quantities of rice and wheat flour, despite the arrangements 
already in place to shift to food stamps denominated in terms of financial value (ibid).  
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Neguma scheme, which covered perhaps 20 per cent of the population. By this point the 
programme was very low cost (World Bank 2015: Chapter 3). 
 This combination of increasingly clientelistic politics, growing ethnic conflict (with near 
continuous armed conflict with Tamil separatist groups between 1983 and 2009, and a 
major Sinhalese youth insurgency in other areas of the country in 1987-89), increasingly 
repressive government (until early 2015), the large expansion of the armed forces, and 
the wider availability and use of unlicensed firearms, decreased the benefits and 
increased the risks attached to political and civil society activism. Rates of electoral 
participation peaked in the 1977 general election and 1982 presidential election. 
 The weakening of the interest groups that had supported universalistic social spending 
programmes is clearly reflected in the erosion of those programmes. The fate of the rice 
ration scheme has been summarised above. The other very marked change has been a 
substantial decline in the proportion of public spending – and an even larger decline in 
the proportion of GDP – that is devoted to education. The Sri Lankan government 
currently spends less of its budget on education than any other government in the South 
Asian region (World Bank 2011).34  
 
Open democratic politics, a mobilised and (somewhat) class-conscious electorate, and large-
scale public spending on universalistic social welfare programmes had been mutually-
reinforcing phenomena. Subsequently, the weakening of any one of these institutions 
contributed to the weakening of the others. In an increasingly repressive and clientelistic 
political system, governments could more efficiently purchase the support they needed to 
remain in power by: (a) buying over Members of Parliament (MPs) and other effective 
political organisers – hence the increasing frequency with which these people changed 
allegiances and parties, and (b) distributing public resources on a discretionary basis to small 
groups, as through the Samurdhi and Diva Neguma anti-poverty programmes (above).35 
Less pressure to spend meant less pressure to protect the level of the tax take.  
 
 
5  ‘Easy’ non-tax funding 
 
The electoral pressures to fund large-scale social spending programmes abated slowly and 
over the long term. Other causes of the long-term decline in the tax take kicked in more 
quickly. This was especially true of the shift in the ways of funding government spending that 
occurred in the late 1970s: a move from primary reliance on revenue raised by government 
to a greater dependence on what I label easy non-tax funding – combinations of (a) aid, (b) 
deficit financing, and, later, (c) commercial borrowing.  
 
There was a latent revenue crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since independence 
governments had been heavily taxing the plantation economy. The high tax regime 
depended in large part on heavy taxation of plantation exports (Section 2). That was possible 
as long as the plantation companies earned significant surpluses. Profits had been high in 
the colonial era and beyond, but in the long term the taxable surplus was disappearing. As 
was the case with so many primary commodities, the world market prices for plantation 
products were, behind all the short-term fluctuations, steadily declining relative to the prices 
of the manufactures and other products that Sri Lanka imported.36 Further, the British 
                                                     
34  This low spend is reflected in the poor quality of the education system and the systematic mismatch between what is 
taught in schools and universities, and the aptitudes and skills required in labour markets. This is widely recognised as a 
key constraint on increasing economic productivity. The performance of the health care system has not deteriorated in 
the same way, because of large-scale private health spending. 
35  There is still one significant exception to this pattern: farmers continue to receive a substantial fertiliser subsidy that 
constitutes an important item of public spending, and to some extent they are still organised and mobilised to strongly 
resist attempts to reduce the subsidy. This happened most recently in early 2016. 
36  The ratio of the average price of a country’s exports to the average price of its imports is known as the terms of trade. It 
is expressed as an index. Taking the 1938 figure as 100, by the period 1980-89 Sri Lanka’s terms of trade had 
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plantation companies, alarmed by the frequent talk of nationalisation, had long been running 
down their estates in Sri Lanka, and shifting their assets and efforts to new tea enterprises in 
East Africa. When the Sri Lankan government finally nationalised privately-owned estates in 
1972 and company-owned estates in 1975, they acquired rather degraded resources. The 
politicisation of the management of the new public sector estate companies made the 
situation worse. The large increase in global tea prices in 1976-79 marked the last big 
opportunity for the government to fill its purse from taxing plantation exports. During the 
period 1970/1-1982, revenue from taxes on exports was on average three times as large as 
revenue from import taxes.37 After 1982 world tea and rubber prices remained low, and 
export tax revenue quickly shrank to nothing. Between 1970/1 and 1982 export taxes on 
average accounted for 28 per cent of government revenue. Four years later they accounted 
for only 4 per cent.38  
 
The government responded actively to this loss of a key revenue source. The Business 
Turnover Tax (BTT), which had previously applied only to domestic manufactured products, 
was extended to imported manufactured goods in 1981. The contribution of BTT to total 
revenue increased from 13 per cent in 1980 to 27 per cent in 1983. The additional revenue 
from BTT did not, however, cover more than about half the revenue lost from the 
disappearance of export taxes. There was no complementary effort to raise more revenue 
from direct taxes on income and profits – and even less on wealth. In the 1980s (corporate 
and personal) income taxes continued to account for the same 14-15 per cent of total 
revenue as in the 1970s, and indeed in 1938/9 (Section 2) – and, therefore, for a declining 
proportion of what was now a fast-growing national economy.  
 
Why was the policy response to the loss of export tax revenue not more vigorous? At first 
sight the answer seems obvious: from 1977 the Sri Lankan government suddenly became a 
large aid recipient. Having accounted for only 9 per cent of government spending in the 
period 1973-1977, aid covered 19 per cent over the next five years. Several factors explain 
the increase: the growth in global aid budgets; the landslide election in August 1977 of a 
government that rejected notions of socialism and central planning, and embraced newly-
fashionable ideas of economic liberalisation; and the willingness of that government to 
cooperate with aid donors, notably (a) in major public investments in the much-accelerated 
Mahaweli programme of large-scale hydropower, irrigation and land settlement projects, and 
(b) in putting an end to the subsidised rice ration scheme (Section 4).  
 
The generous aid available after 1977 reduced pressure on the government to find more 
complete substitutes for disappearing export tax revenue. That is true, but it is not the full 
story about the shift to easy funding. In 1978 the routine level of fiscal irresponsibility – the 
size of the fiscal deficit that governments regarded as normal or acceptable – ratcheted up, 
suddenly, substantially and permanently. In 1977 total government spending (minus debt 
repayments) amounted to 132 per cent of total government revenue. The deficit had been 
relatively stable at that level since 1958. In 1978 it jumped to 151 per cent. Thereafter it 
rarely and only briefly fell much below that figure. Between 1978 and 2014, it averaged 157 
per cent. In other words, until 1977 the fiscal deficit averaged just under a third of 
government revenue collection; after 1977 it averaged just over half. And it remained there 
                                                     
deteriorated to 20. To put it another way, in the 1980s the economy had to generate five times as much exports as it 
had done in 1938 to pay for the same level of imports. The terms of trade have deteriorated further since 1989, but not 
so precipitously as earlier. 
37  This figure – 298% – assumes that all revenue earned by government through the monopolistic control of foreign 
exchange through the Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate scheme is to be accounted as taxes on exports. This 
involves some exaggeration of the role of export taxes. It is not possible to calculate a more precise figure. 
38  The last year for which export tax revenue is recorded in the standard revenue accounts was 1993. The abolition of 
export taxes helped motivate private investors to buy the long-term leases of nationalised plantations that the 
government offered them in 1992. 
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even after aid levels began to decline (Table 1).39 This is a story not just of aid (with a large 
grant element), but of easy financing more generally.  
 
Until 1977 governments routinely spent more than they collected in taxes. But overspending 
was limited by the low levels of financing through aid inflows, and fear of triggering 
hyperinflation. No commercial lender would lend significant amounts of money to a 
government that was presiding over a relatively stagnant economy, built largely around a 
plantation export sector that had poor long-term prospects. After 1977 the constraints on 
deficit spending were reduced. Aid inflows increased. Concessional aid eventually declined, 
especially once Sri Lanka reached the status of a middle-income country. But, in the last 
decade in particular, lending on near-commercial terms for infrastructure development – 
especially ports, airports and roads – has been provided on a large scale from China. That, 
in turn, reflects recent changes in Sri Lanka’s relationships with, and significance to, the rest 
of the world. From a geopolitical perspective, the expansion of China’s naval presence and 
ambitions in the Indian Ocean means that Sri Lanka’s port facilities have regained the 
strategic importance they held in the context of European imperialism in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More importantly perhaps, the rapid growth of the 
Indian economy over the past two decades – allied to the expansion of global trade (until 
recently) – has made Sri Lanka a major trans-shipment centre.40 Port and airport facilities 
have expanded rapidly. Colombo is unlikely to fully regain its nineteenth and early twentieth 
century ranking as one of the world’s major ports, but, after more than half a century in the 
doldrums, it is moving up the global rankings for shipping volumes.  
 
From a global perspective, Sri Lanka is again, as it was when the tea plantation economy 
began to expand fast in the 1880s, a piece of valuable real estate from both a geopolitical 
and economic perspective.41 Consequently, the scope for government to borrow on more or 
less commercial terms has expanded considerably. Much as aid donors or commercial 
lenders might enjoin the government to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit, they are in 
aggregate willing to lend so much that fiscal prudence is unnecessary. The incentives to 
raise the tax take to reduce the fiscal deficit have been much muted since this shift to easy 
funding after 1977.  
 
 
6  Institutionalised pressure for tax exemptions 
 
Tax exemptions in their contemporary form were introduced in Sri Lanka in 1951, and slowly 
expanded. They were under the control of the Ministry of Finance. From the perspective of 
orthodox tax economists, there were already too many of them in 1977 (Jenkins 1988: 5). 
Not only were they used much more widely after the change of government in 1977 
(Waidyasekera 2012: 45-6), but an almost unrestricted and largely arbitrary authority to grant 
them was embedded within the apparatus of government. Boosting private investment was a 
policy priority for the government elected in 1977. Partly because of continuing nationalist 
sentiments, the new government initially declared that foreign investment would be confined 
to a new Export Processing Zone (free trade zone) that was to be established north of 
Colombo, with the purpose of boosting exports of products other than the traditional tea, 
rubber and other agricultural commodities. The Export Processing Zone (EPZ) was a 
success. Within a few years Sri Lanka became a major exporter of garments, especially to 
                                                     
39  The contribution of aid to government spending peaked in the early 1980s (20% in 1981-83). Thereafter it declined 
steadily, except for a brief spike in response to the 2004 tsunami. It currently stands at 2% (Table 1). 
40  It was estimated in 2013 that, because of limited facilities at India’s ports, about one-sixth of all containers bound for 
India were trans-shipped through Colombo (The Economist, 10 August 2013: 52). 
41  Trincomalee has a superb natural harbour, and was a significant naval base under colonial rule. Rumours about the 
ambitions of the American, Chinese or Indian navies in relation to Trincomalee are routine.  
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the United States. The organisational arrangements surrounding the EPZ were, however, to 
have considerable – and largely negative – longer-term consequences for raising revenue.  
 
In 1978 the government created the Greater Colombo Economic Commission, with a general 
mission to boost foreign investment, and a specific mandate to establish and manage free 
trade zones. The GCEC was an independent body responsible directly to the president. The 
first chairman and director general was Upali Wijewardena, Sri Lanka’s most successful and 
flamboyant entrepreneur, and a close relative of the president. In practice, Wijewardena had 
almost total autonomy to run the GCEC. There were few limits on his power to grant tax 
holidays for new investments. The authority of the GCEC gradually expanded. In 1982 it took 
over the powers of the Department of Customs in relation to the EPZs. Its authority to 
promote export-oriented industry was expanded beyond the territorial limits of the free trade 
zones to cover the whole country. In the early 1990s the GCEC was renamed the Board of 
Investment, and given the authority to offer tax incentives – tax holidays, concessionary 
corporate income tax rates, generous depreciation allowances, and import and excise duty 
exemptions – to all investors, and not just those producing for export. It was at this point that 
the number of projects with tax holidays from the Board of Investment began to grow rapidly. 
There were only a few dozen in the late 1980s. The figure peaked at over 600 in 2008 (World 
Bank 2012: 36). 
 
The Ministry of Finance also had authority to offer tax incentives under the Inland Revenue 
Act. ‘Although originally these incentives were focused on areas not covered by the Board of 
Investment Act, there has been significant overlap in recent years’ (World Bank 2012: 36-7). 
On 27 April 2016, the government announced that in future only the Ministry of Finance 
would have the power to grant tax incentives. This comes after a period of about 35 years 
during which larger investors – most of whom are local rather than foreign – became 
increasingly accustomed to lobbying for and expecting tax exemptions.42 Yet levels of private 
investment have never been particularly high. In practice, arguments about the need to 
motivate investors with tax exemptions have been used to justify a very indulgent position 
towards the taxation of corporate profits.  
 
 
7  Absentee finance ministers 
  
From 1948 to 1978, Sri Lanka was governed under the Westminster model: prime minister 
and Cabinet were ultimately responsible to parliament. Under that regime, ministers of 
finance were almost universally very senior politicians, typically at the forefront of policy 
debates. In 1978, the newly-elected government introduced what is often termed a ‘Gaullist’ 
constitution, which combined a prime minister and Cabinet drawn from elected legislators 
with a powerful, directly-elected executive president. The first executive president, J. R. 
Jayawardena, held office until January 1988. Although his government was increasingly 
authoritarian in its dealings with other political parties and opposition in the trade unions and 
civil society (Section 4), Jayawardena was in control of his party and ruled in a relatively 
collegial fashion, giving considerable autonomy to a number of senior lieutenants.43 Among 
them was Ronnie de Mel, arguably the most influential minister of finance in Sri Lanka’s 
history, who held the post continuously from July 1977 until January 1988.  
                                                     
42  There is no single authoritative list of tax exemptions. In March 2016, S. R. I. Perera of KPMG, Colombo stated that 
there were more than 140 exemptions for VAT alone (Daily Financial Times, 23 March 2016). The following were 
among the activities that received new tax incentives in the 2012 budget: the import of high quality pharmaceutical 
products; health services; research (income and VAT); the personal income tax of people engaged in research and 
technology; all income from the management of sports facilities; the income of international sports trainers; and fitness 
equipment for use in sports complexes (customs duties and VAT). 
43  A number of these figures, including the people who ran the GCEC (Section 6), the large Mahaweli irrigation and 
hydropower investment programme, the national airline and the Ministry of Policy Planning and Plan Implementation, 
were not elected politicians. 
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The next executive president, R. Premadasa, had a strong popular electoral base but for a 
range of reasons, including his social origins, was something of an outsider to the national 
political elite. He marginalised senior party colleagues, and ruled in an autocratic fashion. 
During his first year in office he appointed an independent minister of finance, and left in 
place the existing secretary to the ministry, a distinguished career public servant. After a 
year, in April 1989, radically different arrangements were introduced. They were more 
aligned to the reality of a quasi-autocratic executive presidency. The figurehead prime 
minister, who formally held several other portfolios, nominally became the minister of finance. 
Real power lay with the new secretary, R. Paskaralingam, a civil servant with almost no 
public profile but powerful personal networks within the public service, and a reputation for 
getting things done. Paskaralingam became the dominant channel through which the 
president ruled the country. The notion that the two of them together controlled the 
government became almost universally accepted.44 Paskaralingam was secretary to the 
Ministry of Finance for five years. He remained in post for almost a year after President 
Premadasa was assassinated, when the former figurehead prime minister, D. B. Wijetunge, 
became caretaker president.  
 
With small variations and brief exceptions, this combination – a nominal minister of finance 
and a powerful secretary of finance with wide-ranging powers responsible directly to the 
president – was in place from 1989 until early 2015:  
 
 Except for a brief period of two and a half years in 2001-4, when President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga had to accept a government formed by the political opposition, the minister 
of finance portfolio was held either by the president (November 1994 to December 2001, 
and November 2005 to January 2015) or by a politician with little independent standing 
(April 2004 to November 2005). 
 With a few limited exceptions, the post of secretary to the Ministry of Finance was held by 
people known to be trusted by the president and entrusted with wide decision-making 
powers, including in relationship to investors and aid donors. The most prominent was P. 
B. Jayasundera, who held the post for a total of almost 13 years, under President 
Kumaratunga and her successor Mahinda Rajapaksa.45  
 
What reason do we have to believe that these organisational arrangements, which I label 
‘absentee finance ministers’, contributed to the decline in the tax take? Consider the likely 
role of ministers of finance in two sets of economic and geostrategic circumstances: 
 
 In the first scenario, which corresponds to Sri Lanka before 1977, the government faces 
sluggish economic growth in the long term, limited aid inflows and the near-absence of 
external commercial financing. No external power is willing to prop it up financially for 
geostrategic reasons. In these circumstances, any government determined to avoid 
hyperinflation needs, in addition to organisational and technical competence in the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, a minister of finance with real political 
influence: someone who can control the spending urges of other ministers and obtain 
political support for revenue collection measures.  
 In the second scenario: aid inflows increase; the rate of economic growth accelerates, 
both because the country is an important link in global shipping chains at a time when 
global commodity trade is growing fast, and because a very large neighbouring economy 
is expanding rapidly; an emerging superpower has a strong interest in its excellent port 
                                                     
44  This was not true in respect of very pressing security issues, which were handled by other trusted lieutenants. When 
Premadasa became president, parts of the North of the country were controlled by the Indian armed forces, who were at 
that point battling with Tamil separatists; and armed leftist-nationalist insurgents had a major influence in large parts of 
the rest of the island.  
45  In 2008 T. B. Jayasundera was removed from office by the Supreme Court because of violation of tender procedures 
relating to a very large contract for the expansion of the Port of Colombo. In the following year, a new Chief Justice 
over-ruled that decision, and Jayasundera returned to his post. 
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facilities, and is willing to finance a great deal of infrastructure development; and 
commercial lenders are willing to risk their money by making loans to a government that 
has so many friends. This is a simplified characterisation of Sri Lanka since 1977. A 
strong minister of finance is less essential because controlling spending and raising 
revenue are lower political priorities. The most ambitious and able ministers might be 
more interested in heading spending ministries, from where they can nourish their own 
political networks and constituencies without incurring the unpopularity that typically 
accrues to ministers of finance. More important, presidents have more leeway to use 
control over the Ministry of Finance – typically a strategic point from which to monitor and 
control the apparatus of government generally – for their own political purposes. They 
might be especially inclined to use it for control purposes if they do not feel that their own 
political party or faction is a reliable, loyal and effective instrument of rule. 
 
What is the evidence that the absence of a powerful minister of finance – interacting with 
other factors, especially easy non-tax funding (Section 5) – has contributed to the decline in 
the tax take? First, there is the deductive argument set out above. Second, people familiar 
with economic policymaking in Sri Lanka over the long term find the argument convincing. 
Third, the timing fits: 
 
 The absentee finance minister arrangement was introduced in April 1989; the steady 
decline in the tax take dates from 1990.  
 There was a brief interruption for 29 months between December 2001 and April 2004, 
when the UNP enjoyed a parliamentary majority and Ranil Wickremesinghe became 
prime minister – although the president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, who was from the 
SLFP, was not cooperative. The minister of finance, K. N. Choksy, was a senior member 
of the UNP. That government enjoyed neither the longevity nor the power to effect much 
fiscal reform, but did attempt one ambitious, albeit unsuccessful, tax reform initiative: the 
amalgamation of the three tax collection agencies – Customs, Excise and Inland 
Revenue – into a single revenue authority. 
 In January Ranil Wickremesinghe again became prime minister. As before, the president 
– now Maithripala Sirisena – was from the SLFP. Wickremesinghe, however, enjoyed 
more autonomy over economic policy. He appointed an independent minister of finance 
and a career public servant took over as secretary to the ministry. The new finance team 
has exhibited considerable enthusiasm for raising revenue. Although many of their 
proposals have been introduced hastily and later withdrawn in the face of vigorous 
political opposition, they have taken sufficient emergency measures to halt and perhaps 
reverse the long decline in the tax take.46  
 
There is then convincing evidence that the absence of powerful ministers of finance has 
undermined revenue collection. 
 
 
8  Lock-in to import taxes 
  
Levies on international trade have been the prime revenue source for the rulers of Sri Lanka 
for centuries. The structure of the plantation export economy encouraged an emphasis on 
trade taxes: the ratio of international trade to GDP was high, and that trade largely comprised 
highly visible bulk commodities – tea and rubber out, food grains and consumer goods in – 
routed through Colombo port (Section 2). Import taxes have dominated. Colonial 
administrations understandably refrained from taxing plantation exports. The first post-
                                                     
46  The emergency measures include a one-off extra profit tax in 2015, an increase in the standard Value Added Tax (VAT) 
rate, and a large increase in import duties on motor vehicles. The tax take has increased slightly from a low of 11.3% of 
GDP in 2014. 
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independence administration had different interests. Between 1948 and the early 1980s 
plantation exports were taxed heavily, and at some points generated more revenue than 
import duties (Section 2). However, the taxable plantation surplus gradually shrank and 
eventually disappeared. From the early 1980s taxes on imports again became the main 
single revenue source (Section 5). It would be tempting to assume that this high dependence 
on import taxes is a natural consequence of the structure of the economy, or of 
organisational and policy inertia. Neither assumption is justified. The lock-in to import duties 
is to a large degree a result of political choices. To explain this slightly complex story, let us 
begin with the information in Table 3: a comparison of the main sources of government 
revenue at the end of the (pre-World War Two) colonial period (1938/9), and today (average 
2011-14). 
 
Table 3 Major sources of government revenue (% of total), 1938/9 and 2011-14* 
 1938/9 Average 2011-14  
Taxes on imports** 47% 43% 
Total income taxes 15% 19% (comprising 13% from personal and 
corporate income tax and 6% from taxes 
on interest earned on bank deposits)  
Excise taxes on liquor and tobacco 13% 13% 
Social security contributions 1.9% 1.3% 
VAT and other taxes levied on 
domestic sales 
- 15% 
Surplus from public sector income-
earning activities 
 18% (mainly land sales, port, post 
office, electricity and railway)  
(large deficits) 
* Sources: Snodgrass (1966: 385-6); Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance (2015: 49); Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance (2016: 73-4); 
and Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2015: table 101). Note that the figures for 2011-14 are from the Annual Reports of the 
Ministry of Finance, and based on a substantive classification of revenue sources. By contrast, the figures in Table 2, from 
the Annual Reports of the Central Bank, are based on a formal classification of revenue sources. They provide a very 
misleading impression of the extent of taxation of imports. The import duties that are listed in the Central Bank reports 
account for only about 20% of the taxes that are actually levied on imports. 
** The figure for 1938/9 refers to import duties, and the figure for 2011-2104 to all taxes levied on imports, including VAT, 
excises on petroleum and cars, the Nation Building Tax, the Ports and Airports Development Levy, the Special Commodity 
Levy and the Cess Levy. 
 
Although blessed with easy import revenue, colonial governments did not fail to develop 
other revenue sources. More or less complete internal self-government was introduced in 
1931, with a new State Council elected by universal suffrage. In 1932 the State Council 
introduced an income tax along British lines, and an Income Tax Department to assess and 
collect it (Section 2). As the figures in Table 3 indicate, the main differences between the late 
colonial period and today are that: (a) public sector enterprises formerly generated significant 
surpluses, whereas today they are the source of large deficits; and (b) the resultant gap is in 
large degree covered by VAT revenue. It is, however, the similarities between the two 
periods that are most striking: the continued high dependence on taxes on imports; the 
importance in both cases of taxes falling directly on consumers, especially excise taxes on 
liquor and tobacco; the near-absence of wealth taxes; and the minor role of taxes on 
income.47 Note also that social security contributions are even smaller today than in 1938/9, 
and that a third of income tax revenue collected today comes from a levy on bank interest, 
collected on a withholding basis by the banks. Contemporary governments have no greater 
capacity than did the 1938 colonial government to record the income of companies and 
wealthier individuals, assess them for income tax, and collect that tax. In fact, if we then take 
into account the decline of imports relative to other components of the national economy 
since 1938, it appears that the capacity (or willingness?) to tax income has declined since 
the colonial period. In 1938/9, total imports were valued at 36 per cent of GNP (Snodgrass 
1966; Central Bank of Ceylon 1974). Today (2011-14) they account for 26 per cent of GDP.48 
                                                     
47  There are no significant wealth taxes at either point. 
48  And 27% of GNI. Figures from Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2015). 
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Between these two points in time, the base on which taxes on imports could be collected has 
thus shrunk relative to other components of the national economy. Yet taxes collected on 
imports account for almost as high a proportion of revenue today as they did in 1938. This 
shift to a higher dependence on import taxes, relative to the potential tax base, is the mirror 
image of the failure to expand the taxation of income (or wealth). How do we explain this 
failure? 
 
There is one particular part of the story that merits mention: governments headed by 
President Mahinda Rajapakse (2005-2015), both responding to and encouraging intensive 
lobbying from the private sector, introduced a range of new charges and surcharges on 
imports that were intended to protect local business from import competition.49 There is, 
however, a larger and more complex story about the interaction of politics and institutions, 
which can best be introduced by comparing the Colombo headquarters of the two main 
revenue-collecting organisations: the Customs Department and the Inland Revenue 
Department.  
 
The Customs Department occupies a spacious new building with generous staff facilities and 
capacious executive offices. The staff are relatively well rewarded, not least because they 
receive substantial bonuses from seizures of illegal imports. The senior staff, who are almost 
entirely male,50 exude self-confidence. They are often named in newspapers, mainly in 
connection with detections of attempted smuggling or illegal imports, including drugs. They 
report that they are consulted by government in advance of changes in customs rates or 
policies. The Customs Department collected 55 per cent of total tax revenue in 2014. By 
contrast, the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), operating from an old shabby and 
somewhat cramped headquarters building, collected 35 per cent.51 The senior staff of the 
IRD do not exhibit the self-confidence and authority of their peers at the Customs 
Department.52 There are no generous bonuses to be earned in the IRD, and the consensus 
among those I have consulted is that illegal earnings are unlikely to be high. Senior IRD staff 
report that they are not consulted by government before changes in tax policy. The IRD 
Annual Performance Report follows the established factual reporting format. Customs have a 
much better command of contemporary managerial style. Their Annual Performance Report 
is twice the length of the IRD report, is better designed, and is to some degree organised 
around quantitative information on performance targets and achievements for individual 
operational units. The Customs Department is more active in providing staff training, and, 
unlike the IRD, has a separate Directorate for this purpose. 
 
These two organisations have not always been positioned this way in terms of power and 
prestige. Historically the Inland Revenue Department was the more senior of the two. In Sri 
Lanka, as formerly in the UK,53 Customs was viewed almost as a blue collar occupation, 
performing policing tasks that required little analytic capacity. It was the white collar Inland 
Revenue Department that required analytic skills, recruited the academic high flyers and 
enjoyed professional prestige. In the immediate post-independence period in Sri Lanka, the 
Inland Revenue Department was typically the third career choice – after the Civil Service 
                                                     
49  It introduced a range of new charges, most of them surcharges on import duties – the Nation Building Tax, Ports and 
Airports Development Levy, Special Commodity Levy and Cess Levy – that collectively resulted in a major shift towards 
a protectionist economic policy.  
50  According to the 2014 Annual Report of the Customs Department, there were only three women among the thirty-five 
most senior posts, and they were all working in Human Resource Management or Employee Service (Sri Lanka 
Customs 2015). All the people who appear in photographs on Facebook postings related to the Customs Department 
are male. 
51  The Excise Department collected 7% of the total tax revenue, and most of the remainder came from the 
Telecommunication Levy (Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance 2015). 
52  There are noticeably more women among the senior ranks of the IRD than in Customs. In 2014, four of the eight most 
senior posts were occupied by women. At the next level down, the rank of Senior Commissioner, there were six women 
and fifteen men (Sri Lanka Department of Inland Revenue 2015). 
53  Before the UK Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue Departments were merged in 2004.  
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(later Administrative Service) and the Foreign Service – for those with the highest grades in 
the public service entrance examination. How did the prestige and power of the two 
departments come to be inverted? Part of the explanation is that, as post-1977 governments 
lost interest in taxing income and wealth, they also lost interest in trying to protect the 
organisational quality of the Inland Revenue Department. It was instead infected by the 
general deterioration in the quality of recruitment, management, discipline and morale that 
affected almost the entire public service.54 But why did the same not happen in the Customs 
Department, at least to the same extent? 
 
The answer is that, for a combination of reasons, the Customs Department has become a 
strategic organisation from the perspective of governments: an organisation from which they 
require competence and over which they need to exercise control.55 Three of the reasons are 
straightforward:  
 
 After the outbreak of separatist conflict in the early 1980s, Customs assumed important 
security functions that they hitherto lacked. 
 There is scope for large-scale illegal earnings in Customs; politicians in power seek a 
share. 
 More recently, the big growth of the trans-shipment trade and large-scale investments in 
container terminal facilities (Section 5) have increased the importance of an effective 
Customs Department.   
 
The fourth reason for the strategic role of the Customs Department is a little more complex, 
and related to the character of contemporary interest group politics.  
 
The working-class-based trade union and Marxist political movements that were so 
prominent in the mid-twentieth century have largely disappeared (Section 4). This does not 
mean that governments now face little opposition from societal groups. There are many 
interest groups. Some are formidably organised. Virtually all of them represent sectional 
interests within the wealthier half of the population. Top of the list is the General Medical 
Officers Association (GMOA), which has proven itself remarkably effective in protecting and 
enlarging the privileges of doctors employed in government facilities. The GMOA is quickly 
able to bring the public health service to a halt. A wide range of other professional 
associations exercise similar power on a reduced scale. Cricketing bodies are well 
represented in policymaking. All governments are mindful of the need to mollify elected MPs. 
Since the creation of a powerful executive presidency in 1978, most MPs have little influence 
on policymaking and a decreasing attachment to any particular political party. They can 
cause a great deal of trouble for governments if not given continual sweeteners.  
 
                                                     
54  There is indirect evidence for this in contemporary differences between the two Departments in the ethnic composition 
of their senior staff cadres. Of the 29 most senior people in the Inland Revenue Department in 2014, 28 have Sinhalese 
names (Sri Lanka Department of Inland Revenue 2015). By contrast, only 23 of the 35 most senior people in the 
Customs Department in 2014 have Sinhalese names, and 12 have Tamil or Muslim names (Sri Lanka Customs 2015). 
The population of Sri Lanka is about 70% Sinhalese. Sinhalese totally dominate the senior ranks of the Inland Revenue 
Department, but are proportionately represented in the Customs Department. Historically, various minority ethnic groups 
were over-represented at more senior levels of the public service, and in more specialist and professional posts. Fuelled 
by political competition between ethnic groups and then by separatist conflict, that over-representation has generally 
gone into reverse in recent decades. Both electoral pressures and the shift to a more clientelistic political system have 
favoured recruitment of Sinhalese. The fact that these pressures have not overwhelmed the Customs Department 
suggests that governments have made efforts to protect against complete politicisation, in order to maintain 
organisational competence.  
55  The Customs Department is not particularly efficient according to conventional criteria. e.g. today trade facilitation is the 
primary objective of Customs organisations worldwide. Among other things, this implies suspending automatic physical 
inspections of every trade consignment, permitting ‘trusted traders’ to move their goods fast across borders and through 
ports on the basis of pre-cleared electronic documentation and statistical risk analysis of the likelihood of false 
declarations. Although the Sri Lanka Customs Department acknowledge this as an important objective, as of mid-2016 
they were still physically inspecting every consignment. 
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Governments routinely use exemptions from a range of import duties on motor vehicles to 
sweeten these middle-class interest groups. Given the large consumer appetite for motor 
vehicles,56 the near-absence of any domestic vehicle assembly, and the relatively high 
overall level of import protection, these exemptions are very valuable. In 2014 duties of 
various kinds on motor vehicle imports accounted for 27 per cent of the total revenue 
collected by the Customs Department (Sri Lanka Customs 2015: 13). Beneficiaries routinely 
sell the vehicles imported with the benefit of exemptions, and go back for more. Because the 
rules about who may benefit from which exemptions are complex and frequently changed, 
Customs staff in practice have a great deal of discretion over the charges they levy on 
imported vehicles. In turn, politicians in power can influence the way in which that discretion 
is exercised. No government would want a Customs Department that was so incompetent or 
corrupt that it was not a reliable instrument for the exercise of this kind of political patronage.  
 
In sum, the apparent lock-in to reliance on import duties for revenue is not the result either of 
the structure of the economy (i.e. a high ratio of international trade) or of organisational and 
policy inertia. It reflects two broad political factors, that are almost opposite sides of the same 
coin: the clear reluctance of governments, especially since 1977, to tax income and wealth 
(Section 9); and the growth of the power and prestige of the Customs Department relative to 
the Inland Revenue Department. From the perspective of government, Customs has become 
the department that delivers a range of valuable services (including security and the 
management of an important mechanism of political patronage). That in turn interacts with 
some concern within government to preserve the institutional integrity of the Customs 
Department; willingness to permit high earnings within the Department; high staff quality; the 
inclination of government to consult with Customs over policy issues; and a tendency to 
allocate to Customs a high share of new revenue-raising instruments.57  
 
 
9  Concluding comments 
 
It was not only the relative ease with which the plantation export economy could be taxed 
that generated a high tax take in Sri Lanka in the mid-twentieth century. The revenue system 
was in some respects quite advanced: an income tax had been raising significant revenue 
since 1932; the senior staff of the Inland Revenue Department were part of the public service 
elite; self-assessment for income tax was introduced as early as 1972/3; and a relatively 
sophisticated Business Turnover Tax, with some features of a VAT, was in place from 1963 
until it was replaced by VAT in 1998 (de Silva 1992: 193).58 However, the contemporary 
revenue system looks antiquated. At the macro level, it generates only about half the 
revenue one would expect (Introduction),59 and bears excessively heavily on imports 
(Section 8).60 At the level of detail, it is deficient in many respects: most wholesale and retail 
activity was exempted from VAT until 2014 (IMF 2014: 10); there are an excessively large 
number of VAT rates, which are changed frequently; tax exemptions have multiplied (Section 
                                                     
56  In the years 2012-2014, on average 412,000 motor vehicles were imported annually, to serve a total population of just 
over 20 million (Sri Lanka Customs 2015). 
57  In 2014 import duties accounted for only 18% of the revenue collected by the Customs Department. The others were: 
VAT (22%), Excise Duty (22%), Port and Airport Development Levy (15%), Special Commodity Levy (11%), Import 
Cess (8%) and Nation Building Tax (5%) (ibid). 
58  The replacement of the Business Turnover Tax with VAT in 1998 remains controversial. It was the result of strong 
pressure from the IMF, with considerable local professional opposition. The outcome was a relatively incomplete and 
ineffective VAT. 
59  Correspondingly, the shadow economy – economic activity that is deliberately concealed from government authorities – 
is estimated to be unusually high in Sri Lanka. Using data for 1999-2006, the shadow economy was estimated to 
amount to about 44% of GDP in Sri Lanka, compared to 22% for India, around 36% for Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Nepal, and an average of 36% for all developing countries studied (Schneider et al. 2010). 
60  Note, however, that the cost of revenue collection in Sri Lanka is relatively low, and has long been so (Jenkins 1988). 
This is likely because of the high level of unchecked self-assessment by taxpayers, and, more generally, the limited 
resources put into revenue collection. 
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6); self-reporting by taxpayers has not been balanced by a reasonable degree of auditing of 
returns by the tax authorities, such that evasion is relatively easy; tax collection staff appear 
to enjoy a high degree of discretion, and focus their efforts on a relatively small number of 
registered taxpayers; until recently, tax amnesties were ‘granted with almost monotonous 
regularity’, but did not generate significant additional revenue (Waidyasekera 2012: 333); 
there are far too many different taxes and levies;61 at the end of 2014, 503,000 individuals, 
less than 6 per cent of the labour force, were registered with the Inland Revenue Department 
for personal income tax (Sri Lanka Department of Inland Revenue 2015: 15) – partly 
because public servants have been almost entirely exempt from personal income tax since 
1979; rules, laws and treaties for taxing foreign investors and controlling tax evasion through 
transfer mispricing in international economic transactions have received little attention;62 
undervaluation of imports is believed to be widespread; and the revenue collection 
departments have not had good access to third-party information through systematic 
linkages with other relevant government departments, like Electricity, Telecommunications, 
Land Registry and Motor Vehicles.63  
 
The broad explanation for all this is that, since 1977 in particular, governments have been 
willing to allow the revenue system – especially the Inland Revenue Department – to decay, 
because this has been in the immediate material interest of the wealthier sections of the 
population: those who pay little or no direct tax on their (fast-growing) income, property 
values and other wealth, and are not directly impacted by the degeneration of under-funded 
public education, health and social protection systems. The current prime minister, in power 
since January 2015, has long been aware of and concerned about revenue performance. It 
has become urgent because commercial creditors have become wary of lending even more 
to a government that is still running large fiscal deficits and has seemed unable to stem the 
revenue decline. The new government has responded with emergency revenue-raising 
measures. These have had some success, but still face very strong political and public 
opposition.64 There is very little public understanding of or sympathy for the government’s 
fiscal position. Taxes are never popular, but, for historical reasons, the Sri Lankan electorate 
exhibits a particularly deeply-embedded hostility (Section 2). There is clearly no easy way of 
overcoming such resistance. But a policy measure suggested by the 1968 Taxation Enquiry 
Commission, and still not implemented, might have some traction. 
 
The Commission concluded that taxation in Sri Lanka was badly organised. The three 
revenue collection Departments – Customs, Excise and Inland Revenue – were under the 
general authority of the Treasury, but operated independently of one another. Further, there 
was no appropriate forum within the apparatus of government to debate tax policy options. 
The Commission recommended the creation of a Directorate of Revenue to oversee the 
collection process, with a director general directly responsible to the minister of finance. The 
director general would also chair a Permanent Taxation Commission, which would advise the 
minister on tax policy – and include non-official members (Government of Ceylon 1968: 50-
7). The 1986 and 1990 Taxation Enquiry Commissions made very similar recommendations 
                                                     
61  In his 2016 Budget Speech, the finance minister claimed that there are 35 separate taxes and levies. 
62  e.g. it was only in 2008 that Sri Lanka promulgated regulations that would enable the Inland Revenue Department to 
take steps to try to limit the widespread practice of transfer mispricing in international economic transactions. Transfer 
mispricing is a major source of tax avoidance and evasion globally. In 2013, KPMG reported that the regulations were 
not yet being enforced, and that remains the case today. By contrast, India passed its first law on transfer mispricing in 
2001. In the same year, under the Income Tax Ordinance, Pakistan introduced a ‘general anti-avoidance rule’ that gives 
the revenue authorities power to deal with transfer mispricing. A 2016 Action Aid report lists those lower-income 
countries in Africa and Asia that have signed the largest number of restrictive tax treaties that are likely to severely limit 
their taxing powers in relation to foreign investment. Sri Lanka – a country well-endowed with distinguished lawyers – 
comes close to the top of the list (Action Aid 2016).  
63  The Inland Revenue Department is acquiring a new information system that will permit the automation of many existing 
operations and enable others to be performed for the first time, including real-time linkages to databases used by the 
Customs Department and other government departments. Progress is very slow.  
64  e.g. 27 of the revenue proposals included in the finance minister’s 2015 Budget Speech were not implemented because 
of opposition. 
  28 
(de Silva 1992: 196-7; Waidyasekera 2012). They were never accepted. The organisation of 
revenue collection remains the same today as it was in the late colonial period.65 A 
Permanent Taxation Commission, with a mandate to report to parliament as well as to the 
minister of finance, might provide a useful channel to encourage Sri Lanka’s voters and 
politicians to begin treating raising revenue as a serious issue.  
  
                                                     
65  Indeed, the major role that the Greater Colombo Economic Commission/Board of Investment played in granting tax 
incentives from 1978 until 2016 (Section 6) implies an even greater degree of operational fragmentation. 
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